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The battle that never was. 
The Cold War in the North was primarily a naval conflict, and thus governed by maritime 
strategy.1 Maritime strategies are the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial 
factor and determines what fleets do by what part the fleet must play in relation to the overall 
strategy.2 Accordingly, if we are to understand the Cold War in the North, one must first understand 
how the opposing sides intended to use the sea to achieve their strategic aims and what these were.  
The source of the conflict did not originate in the Arctic itself; but the main factors behind its 
strategic importance were geography and technology. The north was a key for strategically targeting 
the other superpower. It offered the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles between them.3 As 
USSR was entirely a continental power, it had to be confronted on land to be defeated. Maritime 
power is not very useful against a state that does not rely on maritime communications unless the 
war is protracted in time. The key theatre was Western Europe, an area of immense strategic 
importance for both Superpowers, both as a US bridgehead in Europe, as an industrial powerhouse, 
and for ideological reasons. Maritime communications were certainly vital for NATO to maintain the 
logistical support of America’s strategic beachhead in Europe, but control of the sea alone was not 
sufficient to defeat the Soviet Union.4 Sea power, NATOs foremost military asset, could directly 
influence events ashore only by strikes launched from carriers and submarines. For the USSR, the sea 
was therefore predominantly a moat against her maritime opponents and later also a safe-haven for 
her retaliatory nuclear capability. As a continental power USSR used or planned to use the oceans to 
hide and protect her SSBNs, and for short-range logistic support and flank manoeuvres in her land 
campaigns.5 To sum it up; the Arctic was the only area through which USSR naval assets could access 
the Atlantic and threaten NATOs SLOCs and likewise the Arctic region provided NATO’s seaborne 
strike forces access to Soviet territory. This combination of strategic retaliation forces and naval 
power projection potential thus formed the strategic background for the Cold War in the North. 
The Third Battle of the Atlantic is a commonly used name for the Cold War in the North but also a 
name that promotes misconceptions, i.e. it implies that maritime communications in the North 
                                                          
1 Both the North and the Arctic does in this paper refer to the European Arctic region including the North-Atlantic Ocean north of 
Greenland-Island-Scotland but not the Baltic. 
2 Paraphrase of Corbett, Julian S., Principles of Maritime Strategy,  (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1911:2004), p. 13. 
3 Tamnes, Rolf og Offerdal, Kristine, Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional Dynamics in a Global World,  (Routledge, 2014), p. 21-
22. 
4 It is, however, commonly claimed that sea powers hold a critical advantage over land powers that eventually will make them prevail as it 
enables a maritime combatant to protract a war in time, extend it in geography, and assemble a coalition able to field a superior landward 
fighting instrument in the end. (Gray, Colin S., War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the next century.,  (Touchstone, 1991), p. 
67-77.) During the Cold War this advantage was to a certain extent nullified by nuclear weapons as their tremendous destructiveness 
limited the political objectives of war as total victory would result in utter Armageddon for both parties. Hence, improving your strategic 
position in a short perspective became more relevant, while the more long-term effects of sea power lost much of its potential as war-
winning tool. 
5 I.e. in Scandinavia, the Baltic, the Black Sea and in the Far East. 
Atlantic were the key strategic objective. Although the Soviet fleet was a significant threat to NATO 
SLOCs, maritime interdiction was by no means its main mission, nor an important secondary 
mission.6 USSR’s war plans for the land campaign were basically offensive and aimed at securing 
Western Europe within weeks.7 Such a rapid attainment of strategic objectives would render 
counter-SLOC operations nearly irrelevant.8 Furthermore, USSR saw destruction of ports and 
infrastructure as more efficient than sinking ships.9  
The overall Soviet naval missions obviously varied somewhat between 1945 and 1991, but their 
variations were, with one exemption, mostly reflections of technological developments. The 
overarching Soviet naval doctrine remained fundamentally defensive and territorial throughout.10 
The exemption was the introduction of SLBMs adding strategic strike capability to the Soviet fleet. 
But only in the 60’s and early 70’s did the Soviets depend on operating in the mid and western 
Atlantic to strike US mainland.11 As SLBMs matured and achieved truly intercontinental range; USSR 
SSBNs withdrew into protected safe havens in USSR home waters off Kola. Thus, at the height of the 
Cold War Moscow’s naval priorities were assessed to be, in order of importance: 
 Providing “combat stability” for Soviet SSBNs, principally through safe havens or bastions. 
 Defend the USSR and its allies from NATO sea-based strike forces, i.e., carriers, and 
submarines. 
 Support ground forces against NATO in Europe or elsewhere. 
 Interdict Western SLOCS.12 
As western SSBNs were well-nigh immune to Soviet ASW efforts, the best defence against them 
was to secure her own SSBNs and thereby assure ability to retaliate if attacked. 13 During WW2 USA 
had clearly shown what carrier battle groups and amphibious forces could achieve if given access.14 
USSR recognised that naval power projection against their flanks constituted a major threat and 
                                                          
6 Ford, Christopher A og Rosenberg, David A, "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy," Journal of Strategic 
Studies 28, no. 2 (2005), Ranft, Bryan og Till, Geoffrey, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed.,  (Hampshire: MacMillan Press, 1989), p. 206-
211., Odom, William E., "Soviet Military Doctrine," Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (1988): p. 127., and Mccgwire, Michael, "Naval Power and 
Soviet Global Strategy," International Security 3, no. 4 (1979): p. 173-174.,  
7 Williamson, Corbin, "Factors Affecting the Feasibility of a Warsaw Pact Invasion of Western Europe,"  (2008): especially p. 29-30. 
8 Lebow, Richard Ned, "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?," International Security 9, no. 4 (1985) 
9 With regards to their efforts to severe SLOCs by destroying ports see to an example Ranft og Till, p. 211. 
10 Williamson,  p. 62-63., and Ford og Rosenberg,  p. 385. 
11 USSR decided in 1963-64 to develop an SLBM system with sufficient range to be able to strike at North America from the comparative 
safety of the home fleet areas. Such missiles were however not deployed in numbers before approximately 1975. (Breemer, Jan S, "The 
Soviet navy's SSBN bastions: Evidence, inference, and alternative scenarios," The RUSI Journal 130, no. 1 (1985): p. 19.)  
12 Ford og Rosenberg,  p. 38. An alternative view is found in Kuzin, Vladimir og Chernyavskii, Sergei, "Russian Reactions to Reagan's 
‘Maritime Strategy’," ibid. But also they claims that the Soviets main naval missions were related to protecting SSBNs and defend against 
NATO sea-based strike forces. They do however emphasise interdiction of NATO SLOCs somewhat more as they see this as an operational 
method to dilute NATOs concentration of force in the Arctic.  
13 Paraphrase of Chipman, Donald D., "Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy," Air University Review 33 (1982) 
14 Throughout the Second World War there were a total of 600 amphibious landings, or an average of one every 3 1/2 days. In addition, 
nearly all these landings were successful. (Sloan, Geoffrey, "Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland theory then and now," The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 22, no. 2-3 (1999): p. 34.) 
emphasised denying it. As technology evolved, NATO carrier-based strike ranges increased to 2000 
km and their striking power increased manifold.15 Therefore, to defend Soviet territory and SSBN 
bastions, efficient sea denial had to be established out to 2000 km from her shores.16 Furthermore, 
sea control had to be maintained in her own waters to protect her SSBN bastions, logistic support to 
land operations, and in-theatre amphibious operations. 
A fleet’s structure has two main relationships with strategy. The fleet is the physical mean that 
can achieve strategic aims and support political purposes, i.e. it determines what can and cannot be 
done at a specific time. Additionally, as an expensive long-term investment a fleet’s structure and 
development always reveals a lot about what it is intended for. Admiral Gorshkov promoted an 
assertive navy, one that would move out from the coastlines and into the oceans to challenge the 
West. The mission of these forward-deploying Soviet ships were to counter the West’s sea-based 
strike force and partly to interdict sea lines of communication.17 Looking at force development one 
straightforwardly sees that protection against power projection and later also SSBN security 
remained their foremost missions throughout the Cold War. The Soviet navy was never balanced nor 
capable of major maritime power projection beyond nuclear bombardment.18  
A NORWEGIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Control of Norway and Iceland was strategically vital for both parties as their geographic position 
astride key waterways and access routes allowed efficient intelligence gathering, air operations, and 
forward staging of strike forces both for NATO and USSR. This explains why NATO emphasised 
defence of these areas as an important task and allocated very substantial forces to it, forces one 
otherwise would assume would be better employed in Western Europe. It also explains why the 
Soviet Union aimed at gaining control of Norwegian territory if war should erupt. It does thus show 
how a small state could become involved and even a focus area for great-power conflicts even if it 
had no conflicting interest with either superpower. USSR’s defensive maritime strategy was offensive 
at the operational level. Bastion defence and the requirement for operational depth in USSR coastal 
defences, both rendered Norway well within the geographic area USSR had to dominate if their 
maritime strategy was to succeed. The Cold War ended in 1989-91, but this geostrategic fact remains 
                                                          
15 The Tomahawk land-attack missile T-LAM(N) BGM-109A had a range of 2500 km and carrier a 200-250 kt nuclear warhead. These started 
to be deployed in numbers from 1983. (Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War at Sea," International Security 10, no. 3 (1985): p. 12.)  The 
introduction of these weapons constituted a major increase in naval strike capability both with regards to range and penetration ability. 
16 This is discussed in some length in Kuzin og Chernyavskii,  p. 432-437. 
17 Chipman,  
18 By balanced one means a fleet that can conduct every kind of operation wherever one decides, i.e. typically the fleet of a major sea 
power. If one, however, by balanced defines a fleet with a full range of capabilities within its specific mission portfolio, then the Soviet fleet 
might be considered balanced. 
unchanged and is steadily becoming more acute yet again. This geostrategic fact is probably also 
directly transferable to the Eastern Asia sphere. 
CONCLUSION 
USSR’s maritime strategy was essentially defensive and territorial, it did not challenge NATO’s 
overall maritime supremacy but aimed at eliminating any real strategic advantage NATO could gain 
from their command of the seas. Furthermore, USSR depended on the sea for their ability to deter 
and ensure nuclear retaliation. USSR’s maritime strategy can therefore be seen as a mean to ensure 
that any conflict would not escalate out of the political realm unless the Soviets themselves decided 
so, and to neutralise the sea as warfare domain that could significantly influence the overall strategic 
picture negatively for the Soviet Union. 
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